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Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our 
previous work (Cao & Illing, 2008), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to 
endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort 
policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity 
available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial 
requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of 
equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold 
sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that both policies are 
strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last 
resort policy. 
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 The events earlier this month leading up to the acquisition of Bear
Stearns by JP Morgan Chase highlight the importance of liquidity man-
agement in meeting obligations during stressful market conditions. ...
The fate of Bear Stearns was the result of a lack of conﬁdence, not a lack
of capital. ... At all times until its agreement to be acquired by JP Mor-
gan Chase during the weekend, the ﬁrm had a capital cushion well above
whatisrequiredtomeetsupervisorystandardscalculatedusingtheBasel
II standard.
— Chairman Cox, SEC, Letter to Basel Committee in Support of New
Guidance on Liquidity Management, March 20, 2008
Bear Stearns never ran short of capital. It just could not meet its obliga-
tions. At least that is the view from Washington, where regulators never
stepped in to force the investment bank to reduce its high leverage even
after it became clear Bear was struggling last summer. Instead, the regu-
latorsissuedrepeatedreassurancesthatallwaswell.Doesitsoundalittle
like a doctor emerging from a funeral to proclaim that he did an excellent
job of treating the late patient?
— Floyd Norris, New York Times, April 4, 2008
1 Introduction
For a long time, presumably starting in 2004, ﬁnancial markets seemed to
havebeenawashwithexcessiveliquidity.Butsuddenly,inAugust2007,liq-
? First version: April, 2008. This version: April 2009. The authors thank Jean-
Charles Rochet, Antoine Martin, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and seminar partici-
pants at various conferences for useful comments.
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1uidity dried out nearly completely as a response to doubts about the quality
of subprime mortgage-backed securities. Despite massive central bank in-
terventions, the liquidity freeze did not melt away, but rather spread slowly
to other markets such as those for auction rate bonds. On March 16th 2008,
the investment bank Bear Sterns which — according to the SEC chairman
— was adequately capitalized even a week before had to be rescued via a
Fed-led takeover by JP Morgan Chase.
Followingtheturmoilonﬁnancialmarkets,therehasbeenastrongdebate
about the adequate policy response. Some have warned that central bank
actions may encourage dangerous moral hazard behaviour of market par-
ticipants in the future. Others instead criticised central banks of responding
far too cautiously. The most prominent voice has been Willem Buiter who
—jointlywithAnnSibert—rightfromthebeginningofthecrisisinAugust
2007 strongly pushed the idea that in times of crises, central banks should
act as market maker of last resort. As adoption of the Bagehot principles
to modern times with globally integrated ﬁnancial systems, central banks
should actively purchase and sell illiquid private sector securities and so
play a key role in assessing and pricing credit risk. In his FT blog “Mavere-
con”, Willem Buiter stated the intellectual arguments behind such a policy
very clearly on December 13, 2007:
“Liquidity is a public good. It can be managed privately (by hoarding inherently
liquid assets), but it would be socially inecient for private banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions to hold liquid assets on their balance sheets in amounts
sucient to tide them over when markets become disorderly. They are meant to
intermediate short maturity liabilities into long maturity assets and (normally)
liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. Since central banks can create unquestioned
liquidity at the drop of a hat, in any amount and at zero cost, they should be
the liquidity providers of last resort, both as lender of last resort and as market
maker of last resort. There is no moral hazards as long as central banks provide
the liquidity against properly priced collateral, which is in addition subject to
the usual ’liquidity haircuts’ on this fair valuation. The private provision of the
2public good of emergency liquidity is wasteful. It’s as simple as that.”
Buiter’s statement represents the prevailing main stream view that there
is no moral hazard risk as long as the Bagehot principles are followed as
best practice in liquidity management.
AccordingtotheBagehotprinciples,aLenderofLastResortPolicyshould
target liquidity provision to the market, but not to speciﬁc banks. Central
banks should “lend freely at a high rate against good collateral.”This way,
public liquidity support is supposed to be targeted towards solvent yet
illiquidinstitutions,sinceinsolventﬁnancialinstitutionsshouldbeunableto
provideadequatecollateraltosecurelending.Thispaperwantstochallenge
the view that a policy following Bagehot principle does not create moral
hazard.Thekeyargumentisthisviewneglectstheendogeneityofaggregate
liquidity risk. Starting with Allen & Gale (1998) and Holmstr¨ om & Tirole
(1998), there have been quite a few models recently analysing private and
public provision of liquidity. But as far as we know, in all these models
except our companion paper Cao & Illing (2008), aggregate systemic risk is
assumed to be an exogenous probability event.
InHolmstr¨ om&Tirole(1998),forinstance,liquidityshortagesarisewhen
ﬁnancialinstitutionsandindustrialcompaniesscramblefor,andcannotﬁnd
the cash required to meet their most urgent needs or undertake their most
valuable projects. They show that credit lines from ﬁnancial intermediaries
aresucientforimplementingthesociallyoptimal(second-best)allocation,
as long as there is no aggregate uncertainty. In the case of aggregate uncer-
tainty, however, the private sector cannot satisfy its own liquidity needs,
so the existence of liquidity shortages vindicates the injection of liquidity
by the government. In their model, the government can provide (outside)
liquidity by committing future tax income to back up the reimbursements.
In the model of Holmstr¨ om & Tirole (1998), the Lender of Last Resort
indeed provides a free lunch: public provision of liquidity in the presence of
aggregate shocks is a pure public good, with no moral hazard involved. The
3reason is that aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events;
there is no endogenous mechanism determining the aggregate amount of
liquidity available. The same holds in Allen & Gale (1998), even though
they analyse a quite dierent mechanism for public provision of liquidity:
the adjustment of the price level in an economy with nominal contracts. We
adopt Allen & Gale’s mechanism. But we show that there is no longer a
free lunch when private provision of liquidity aects the likelihood of an
aggregate (systemic) event.
The basic idea of our model is fairly straightforward: Financial interme-
diaries can choose to invest in more or less (real) liquid assets. We model
illiquidity in the following way: some fraction of projects turns out to be re-
alisedlate.Theaggregateshareoflateprojectsisendogenous;itdependson
the incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries to invest in risky, illiquid projects.
This endogeneity allows us to capture the feedback from liquidity provi-
sion to risk taking incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries. We show that the
anticipation of unconditional central bank liquidity provision will encour-
age excessive risk taking (moral hazard). It turns out that in the absence
of liquidity requirements, there will be overinvestment in risky activities,
creating excessive exposure to systemic risk.
In contrast to what the Bagehot principle suggests, unconditional pro-
vision of liquidity to the market (lending of central banks against good
collateral) is exactly the wrong policy: It distorts incentives of banks to pro-
vide the ecient amount of private liquidity. In our model, we concentrate
on pure illiquidity risk: There will never be insolvency unless triggered by
illiquidity(byabankrun).Illiquidprojectspromiseahigher,yetpossiblyre-
tarded return. Relying on sucient liquidity provided by the market (or by
the central bank), ﬁnancial intermediaries are inclined to invest more heav-
ily in high yielding, but illiquid long term projects. Central banks liquidity
provision, helping to prevent bank runs with inecient early liquidation,
encouragesbanktoinvestmoreinilliquidassets.Atﬁrstsight,thisseemsto
work ﬁne, even if systemic risk increases: After all, public insurance against
4aggregate risks should allow agents to undertake more proﬁtable activities
with higher social return. As long as public insurance is a free lunch, there
is nothing wrong with providing such a public good.
The problem, however, is that due to limited liability some banks will be
encouraged to free ride on liquidity provision. This competition will force
otherbankstoreducetheireortsforliquidityprovision,too.ChuckPrince,
at that time chief executive of Citigroup, stated the dilemma posed in fairly
poetic terms on July 10th 2007 in a (in-) famous interview with Financial
Times 1 :
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as
longasthemusicisplaying,you’vegottogetupanddance.We’restilldancing.”
The dancing banks simply enjoy liquidity provided in good states of
the world and just disappear (go bankrupt) in bad states. The incentive of
ﬁnancial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good states results in
excessively low liquidity in bad states. Even worse: As long as they are
not run, ”dancing” banks can always oer more attractive collateral in bad
states — so they are able to outbid prudent banks in a liquidity crisis. For
that reason, the Bagehot principle, rather than providing correct incentives,
is the wrong medicine in modern times with a shadow banking system
relying on liquidity being provided by other institutions.
This paper extends a model developed in Cao & Illing (2008). In that
paper we did not allow for banks holding equity, so we could not analyse
1 The key problem is best captured by the following remark about Citigroup in the
NewYorkTimesreport“TreasuryDept.PlanWouldGiveFedWideNewPower”on
March 29, 2008: “Mr. Frank said he realized the need for tighter regulation of Wall Street
ﬁrms after a meeting with Charles O. Prince III, then chairman of Citigroup. When Mr.
FrankaskedwhyCitigrouphadkeptbillionsofdollarsin‘structuredinvestmentvehicles’o
the ﬁrm’s balance sheet, he recalled, Mr. Prince responded that Citigroup, as a bank holding
company, would have been at a disadvantage because investment ﬁrms can operate with
higher debt and lower capital reserves.”
5the impact of equity requirements. As we will show, imposing equity re-
quirements can be inferior even relative to the outcome of a mixed strategy
equilibrium with free riding (dancing) banks. In contrast, imposing binding
liquidity requirements ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy ex
post is able to implement the optimal second best outcome. In our model,
it yields a strictly superior outcome compared to imposing equity require-
ments. We also prove that “narrow banking”(banks being required to hold
sucient equity so as to be able to pay out demand deposits in all states of
the world) is inferior relative to ex ante liquidity regulation.
Allen & Gale (2007, p 213f) notice that the nature of market failure lead-
ing to systemic liquidity risk is not yet well understood. They argue that
“a careful analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of crises is necessary to under-
stand when intervention is necessary.”In this paper, we try to ﬁll this gap,
providing a cost / beneﬁt analysis of dierent forms of banking regulation
to better to understand what type of intervention is required. We explicitly
compare the impact both of liquidity and capital requirements. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper providing such an analysis.
Our argument also seems to be valid for the modelling approach used
in Goodfriend & McCallum (2007). They introduce a banking sector in the
standard New Keynesian framework to reconsider the role of money and
banking in monetary policy analysis. Goodfriend & McCallum show that
“banking accelerator”transmission eects work via an “external ﬁnance
premium.”In their model, the central bank should react more aggressively
to problems in the banking sector. This result may need to be qualiﬁed
if these problems within the banking sector are generated endogenously
rather than being the result of exogenous shocks.
62 The structure of the model
In the economy, there are three types of agents: investors, banks (run by
bankmanagers)andentrepreneurs.Allagentsareriskneutral.Theeconomy
extends over 3 periods. We assume that there is a continuum of investors
each initially (at t = 0) endowed with one unit of resources. The resource
can be either stored (with a gross return equal to 1) or invested in the
form of bank equity or bank deposits. Using these funds, banks as ﬁnancial
intermediaries can fund projects of entrepreneurs. There are two types i of
entrepreneurs (i = 1;2), characterised by their projects return Ri. Project of
type 1 are realised early at period t = 1 with a safe return R1 > 1. Project of
type 2 give a higher return R2 > R1 > 1. With probability p, these projects
will also be realised at t = 1, but they may be delayed (with probability
1   p) until t = 2. In the aggregate, the share p of type 2 projects will be
realised early. The aggregate share p, however is not known at t = 0. It will
be revealed between 0 and 1 at some intermediate period t = 1
2. Investors
are impatient: They want to consume early (at t = 1). In contrast, both
entrepreneurs and bank managers are indierent between consuming early




the absence of commitment problems, investors would simply put all their
funds in early projects and capture the full return. We take this frictionless
market outcome as reference point and analyse those equilibria coming
closest to implement that market outcome. Since there is a market demand
for liquidity only if investor’s funds are the limiting factor, we concentrate
on deviations from the frictionless market outcome and consider investors
payo as the relevant criterion.
Due to hold up problems as modelled in Hart & Moore (1994), en-
trepreneurs can only commit to pay a fraction Ri > 1 of their return.
7Banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries can pool investment; they have superior
collectionskills(ahigher).FollowingDiamond&Rajan(2001),banksoer
deposit contracts with a ﬁxed payment d0 payable at any time after t = 0
as a credible commitment device not to abuse their collection skills. The
threat of a bank run disciplines bank managers to fully pay out all available
resources pledged in the form of bank deposits. There are a ﬁnite number of
active banks engaged in Bertrand competition. Banks compete by choosing
the share ? of deposits invested in type 1 projects, taking their competi-
tors choice as given. Investors have rational expectations about each banks
default probability; they are able to monitor all banks investment. So if,
in a mixed strategy equilibrium, banks dier with respect to their invest-
ment strategy, the expected return from deposits must be the same across
all banks. Due to Bertrand competition, all banks will earn zero proﬁt in
equilibrium. In the absence of aggregate risk, ﬁnancial intermediation via
bank deposits can implement a second best allocation, given the hold up
problem posed by entrepreneurs.
Note that because of the hold up problem, entrepreneurs retain a rent
— their share (1   )Ri. Since early entrepreneurs are indierent between
consuming at t = 1 or t = 2, they are willing to provide liquidity (using
their rent to buy equity and to deposit at banks at t = 1 at the market
rate r). Banks use the liquidity provided to pay out depositors. This way,
impatient investors can proﬁt indirectly from investment in high yielding
long term projects. So banking allows transformation between liquid claims
and illiquid projects.
Atdate0,bankscompetingforfundsoerdepositcontractswithpayment
d0 and equity claims which maximise expected consumption of investors
at the given expected interest rates. Investors put their funds into those
assets promising the highest expected return among all assets oered. So in
equilibrium, expected return from deposits and equity must be equal across
all active banks. At date t = 1, banks and early entrepreneurs trade at a
perfect market for liquidity, clearing at interest rate r. As long as banks are
8liquid, the payo structure is described as in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Timing and payo structure, when banks are liquid
Deposit contracts, however, introduce a fragile structure into the econ-
omy: Whenever depositors have doubts about their bank’s liquidity (the
ability to pay depositors the promised amount d0 at t = 1), they run the
bankearly(theyrunalreadyattheintermediatedatet = 1
2),forcingthebank
to liquidate all its projects (even those funding safe early entrepreneurs) at
high costs: Early liquidation of projects gives only the inferior return c < 1.
We do not consider pure sunspot bank runs of the Diamond & Dybvig type.
Insteadweconcentrateonrunshappeningifliquidfunds(giventheinterest
rate r) are not sucient to payout depositors.
If the share p of type 2 projects realised early is known at t = 0, there
is no aggregate uncertainty. Banks will invest such that — on aggregate —
they are able to fulﬁl depositor’s claims in period 1, so there will be no run.
But we are interested in the case of aggregate shocks. We model them in
the simplest way: the aggregate share of type 2 projects realised early can
take on just two values: either pH or pL with pH > pL. The “good”state with
a high share of early type 2 projects (the state with plenty of liquidity) will
be realised with probability . Note that the aggregate liquidity available
depends on the total share of funds invested in liquid type 1 projects. Let 
bethisshare.IfissolowthatbankscannothonordepositswhenpL occurs,
depositors will run at t = 1
2. The payo is captured in Figure 2.
Given this structure, a bank seems to have just two options available: it
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Fig. 2. Timing and payo structure, when banks are illiquid
may either invest so much in safe type 1 projects that it will be able to pay
outitsdepositorsallthetime(thatis,evenifthebadstateoccurs).Letuscall
this share (pL). Alternatively, it may invest just enough, (pH), so as to pay
out depositors in the good state. If so, the bank will be run in the bad state.
Obviously, the optimal share depends on what other banks will do (since
that determines aggregate liquidity available at t = 1 and so the interest
rate for liquid funds between period 1 and 2), but also on the probability 
for the good state. To gain some intuition, let us ﬁrst assume that all banks
behave the same — just as a representative bank. If so, it will not pay to
take precautions against the bad state if the likelihood for that outcome is
considered to be very low. Thus, if  is very high, the representative bank
will obviously invest only a small share (pH) — just enough to pay out
depositors in the good state. Alternatively, if  is very low (close to 0), it
always pays to be prepared for the worst case, so the representative bank
will invest a high share (pL) > (pH) in safe projects. Since (ps) is the share
invested in safe projects with return R1, the total payo out of investment
strategy (ps) is: E[Rs] = (ps)R1 + [1   (ps)]R2 with E[RH] > E[RL].
With a high share (pL) of safe projects, the banks will be able to pay
out depositors in all states. There will never be a bank run. So independent
of , the expected payo for depositors is E[RL] (assuming that the gross
interest rate between t = 1 and t = 2 is r = 1, which is the case maximising
10the investors payos).








Obviously, for  below 2 depositors are better o with the safe strategy,
so they prefer banks to choose (pL) rather than to exploit high proﬁtability
oftype2entrepreneurs.Theintuitionisstraightforward:Whenisnothigh
enough, the high return R2 will come too late most of the time, triggering
frequent bank runs in period 1. So depositors rather prefer banks to play the
safe strategy in the range. In contrast, for  > 2 it would be inecient for
privatebankstoholdenoughliquidassetsontheirbalancesheetstoprevent
disaster when markets become disorderly. As long as all banks play accord-
ing to the strategies outlined above, depositors’ payo is characterised by
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Fig. 3. Depositors’ expected return
Up to now, we simply assumed that all banks follow the same strategy,
11maximisingdepositor’spayo.Butwhenallbankschoosethestrategy(pL),
there will be excess liquidity at t = 1 if the good state occurs (with a large
share of type 2 projects realised early). A bank anticipating this event has a
strongincentivetoinvestalltheirfundsintype2projects,reapingthebeneﬁt
of excess liquidity in the good state. As long as the music is playing, such a
deviating bank gets up and dances. Having invested only in high yielding
projects,thedancingbankcanalwayscrediblyextractentrepreneur’sexcess
liquidity at t = 1, promising to pay back at t = 2 out of highly proﬁtable
projects. After all, at that stage, this bank, free riding on liquidity, can oer
a capital cushion with expected returns well above what prudent banks
are able to promise. Of course, if the bad state happens, there is no excess
liquidity. The “dancing”banks would just bid up the interest rates, urgently
trying to get funds. Rational depositors, anticipating that these banks won’t
succeed, will already trigger a bank run on these banks at t = 1
2.
When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things get complicated. As
longasdancingbanksarenotsupportedinthebadstate,theyaredrivenout
of the market, providing just the return c. Nevertheless, a bank free riding
on liquidity in the good state can on average oer the attractive return
R2 + (1   )c as expected payo for depositors. Thus, a free riding bank
will always be able to outbid a prudent bank whenever the probability 
for the good state is not too low. The condition is




Since R2 > E[RH], it pays to dance within the range 1   < 2.
Obviously, there cannot be equilibrium in pure strategies within that
range. As long as the music is playing, all banks would like to get up and
dance.Butthen,therewouldbenoprudentbankleftprovidingtheliquidity
needed to be able to dance. In the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium, a
proportion of banks behave prudent, investing some amount s < (pL)
in liquid assets, whereas the rest free rides on liquidity in the good state,
12choosing  = 0. Prudent banks reduce s < (pL) in order to cut down the
opportunity cost of investing in safe projects. Interest rates and s adjust
such that depositors are indierent between the two types of banks. At
t = 0, both prudent and dancing banks oer the same expected return to
depositors. The proportion of free-riding banks is determined by aggregate
market clearing conditions in both states. Dancing banks are run for sure
in the bad state, but the high return R2 > E[Rs] compensates depositors for
that risk.
As shown in Proposition 2.1, free-riding drives down the return for
investors (see Figure 3). They are deﬁnitely worse o than if all banks
would coordinate on the prudent strategy (pL). As illustrated in Figure
3, the eective return on deposits for investors deteriorates in the range
1   < 2 as a result of free riding behaviour.
Proposition 2.1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, investors are worse o than if
all banks would coordinate on the prudent strategy (pL). 2
Proof See Appendix A.1. 2
3 Lender of Last Resort Policy
A lender of last resort cannot create real liquidity at period one. But a
central bank can add nominal liquidity at the stroke of a pen. Following
Allen & Gale (1998) and Diamond & Rajan (2006), assume from now on
that deposit contracts are arranged in nominal terms. The liquidity injection
is done such that the banks are able to honour their nominal contracts,
reducing the real value of deposits just to the amount of real resources
available at that date. This intervention raises the real payo of depositors
compared to inecient liquidation, increasing expected payo of the risky
strategy (pH).
Consider that the central bank injects liquidity in order to prevent bank
13runs if the bad state (with low payos at t = 1) occurs. Such a policy,
preventing inecient costly liquidation, seems to raise investor’s expected
payo and so deﬁnitely improve upon the allocation for high values  > 2.
Essentially, nominal deposits allow the central bank to implement state
contingent payos. This argument seems to conﬁrm the view that lender of
last resort indeed is a free lunch, providing a public good at no cost. It turns
out,however,thattheanticipationoftheseactionshasanadverseimpacton
the amount of aggregate liquidity provided by the private sector, aecting
endogenously the exposure to systemic risk.
The incentive for free riding prevalent in modern times of competitive
ﬁnancial markets complicates the picture dramatically. In the model pre-
sented, a lender of last resort, providing liquidity support to the market
requesting good collateral as the only condition, will drive out all prudent
banks. Just as in Gresham’s law, all banks are encouraged to dance and
choose the risky strategy (pH), knowing that they can get liquidity support
against good collateral. The public provision of emergency liquidity results
in serious moral hazard. It’s as simple as that.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that pHR2+(1 )pLR2  1 and that for  2 (1;2),
d
j
0 = R2 > pHR2 + (1   )c. If the central bank is willing to provide liquidity to
the entire market in times of crisis, all banks have an incentive to dance, choosing
j = 0. 2
Proof See Appendix A.2. 2
The reason for this surprising result is the following: By purpose, we
concentrate on the case of pure illiquidity risk. In our model, the liquidity
shock just retards the realisation of high yielding projects: In the end (at
t = 2), all projects will certainly be realised. So there is no doubt about
solvencyoftheprojects,unlessinsolvencyistriggeredbyilliquidity.Central
bank support against allegedly good collateral, creating artiﬁcial liquidity
at the drop of a hat, destroys all private incentives to care about ex ante
liquidity provision. The key problem with the Bagehot principle here is that
14dancing banks do invest in projects with higher return, as long as they have
not to be terminated. In reality, there is no clear-cut distinction between
insolvency and illiquidity. We leave it to future research to allow for the risk
of insolvency. But we doubt that our basic argument will be aected.
So what policy options should be taken? One might argue that a central
bank should provide liquidity support only to prudent banks (so condi-
tional on banks having invested suciently in liquid assets). As shown in
Cao & Illing (2008), such a policy may improve the allocation at least to
some extent. But we argued that such a commitment is simply not credible:
As emphasised by Rochet (2004), there is a serious problem of dynamic
consistency.
Rather than relying on an implausible commitment mechanism, the ob-
vious solution would be a mix between two instruments: Ex ante liquidity
regulation combined with ex post lender of last resort policy. It seems to
be rather surprising that perceived wisdom argues that central banks can
pursuebothpricestabilityandﬁnancialstabilityusingjustonetool,interest
rate policy. Instead, the second best outcome from the investor’s point of
view needs to be implemented by the following policy: In a ﬁrst step, a
banking regulator has to impose ex ante liquidity requirements. Requesting
minimum investment in liquid type 1 assets of at least (pL) for  < 
0
2
and (pH) for  > 
0
2 would give investors the highest expected payo as
characterised in Figure 4. For  < 
0
2, playing safe gives investors the high-
est payo. In contrast, for  > 
0
2 investors are better o if banks invest in
liquid assets as low as (pH) as long as lender of last resort policy helps
to prevent runs. Since such a rule would not allow banks to operate when
liquidity holdings are less than required, it could get rid of incentives for
free riding. Given that the ex ante imposed liquidity requirements have
been fulﬁlled, ex post the central bank can safely play its role as lender in
the range  > 
0
2 whenever the bad state turns out to be realised. Note that
this policy raises expected payo for investors, even though it increases the
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Fig. 4. Depositors’ expected return with ex ante liquidity regulation and ex post
LOLR policy
The key task for regulators and the central bank is to cope with free
riding incentives. An alternative mechanism compared to ex ante liquidity
regulation, the central bank might commit to try to mop up the excess
liquidity available in the good state. If that can be done, potential free riders
would have no chance to survive. We doubt, however, that the central will
be able to implement such a policy.
As further alternative, one might impose narrow banking in the sense
that banks are required to hold sucient liquid funds so as to pay out in
all contingencies. Finally, one might expect that imposing equity or capital
requirementsaresucienttoprovideacushionagainstliquidityshocks.As
shown in the next section, both these options turn out to be strictly worse
than imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender
oflastresortpolicy.Theyareevenlikelytobeinferiorrelativetotheoutcome
of a mixed strategy equilibrium with free riding (dancing) banks.
164 The role of equity and narrow banking
Let us now introduce equity requirements in the model, i.e. banks are
required to hold some equity in their assets. Keep the same settings as
before with the presence of aggregate uncertainty, except that instead of
pure ﬁxed deposit contract, the banks issue a mixture of deposit contract
and equity for the investors (Diamond & Rajan, 2000, 2005, 2006). To make
it clear, equity is a claim that can be renegotiated such that the bankers and
the capital holders (here the investors) split the residual surplus after the
deposit contract has been paid. The mixture of deposit contract and equity
seems to be a quite artiﬁcial setting at the ﬁrst sight. But actually it turns
out to be a convenient modelling device. In particular, in the symmetric
equilibria of the banks, such a mixture will exactly be the portfolio held by
a representative agent out of the homogenous investors. In other words,
whenever investors are homogenous, it’s not necessary to separate equity
holders from the depositors.
Equity can reduce the fragility, but it allows the bank manager to capture
a rent. Being a renegotiatable claim, equity is always subject to the hold-up
problem, i.e. equity holders can only get a share of  ( 2 [0;1]) from the
surplus. To make it simpler, in the following we simply assume that  = 1
2.
With  = 1
2 the bankers get a rent of
E[R] d0
2 , sharing the surplus over
deposits equally with the equity holders. Suppose that all the banks have to
meet the level of equity k which comes from the central bank’s regulatory






in which Rs;i is bank i’s return achieved under state s.
One additional, but crucial assumptions concerning timing are that (1)
17the dividend of the equity is paid after the payment of d0;i and (2) capital
requirement has to be met till the last minute before the dividend payment
— This deters the bankers’ incentive to transfer their dividend income to
the investors ex post, which increases d0;i ex ante.





Then one would ask: Under what conditions would it make sense to
introduce equity requirements? It is easy to see that introducing equity
will deﬁnitely reduce investor’s payo in the absence of aggregate risk.
Somewhat counterintuitive, capital requirements even reduces the share
 invested in the safe project in that case. The reason is that with equity,
bankers get a rent of
E[R] d0
2 , sharing the surplus over deposits equally with
the equity holders. So investors providing funds in form of both deposits
and equity to the banks will get out at t = 1 just 1
1+kE[R] < E[R]. Since
return at t = 2 is higher than at t = 1, bankers prefer to consume late, so
the amount of resources needed at t = 1 is lower in the presence of equity.
Consequently, the share  will be reduced. Of course, banks holding no
equity provide more attractive conditions for investors, so equity could not
survive. This at ﬁrst sight counterintuitive result simply demonstrates that
there is no role (or rather only a payo reducing role) for costly equity in
the absence of aggregate risk.
But when there is aggregate risk, equity helps to absorb the aggregate
shock. In the simple 2-state set up, equity holdings need to be just sucient









, the bank just
stays solvent in the bad state — it is just able to payout the ﬁxed claims of
depositors, whereas all equity will be wiped out.
With equity k, the total amount that can be pledged to both depositors
18and equity in the good state is 1
1+kE[RH] with claims of depositors being
d0 = 1 k
1+kE[RH] and equity EQ = k
1+kE[RH]. In the bad state, a marginally






























It’s observed that k is decreasing in pL: the higher pL, the lower the equity
k needed to stay solvent in the bad state. k = 0 for pL = pH, and for pL close




. That is if
d0  E[RH] + (1   )c:
Such(d0;k)istheequilibriumforthebanks.Thereasoniseasytosee:First,
no banks are willing to set higher ki — because equity holding is costly and




; Second, no banks are
able to set higher d0;i given (d0;k) set by all the other banks — because k has
to be met when d0;i is paid, the only thing the deviator can do is to bid up
interest rate and this leads to bank runs across the whole banking industry
— the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Fromtheregulator’spointofview,theuniqueoptimalequityrequirement
k it imposes is exactly the k determined by condition (1), which is so high
that the bank just stays solvent in the bad state — it is just able to payout the
ﬁxed claims of depositors, whereas all equity will be wiped out. The reason
is simple: Since equity holding is costly, the only reason for the central bank
to make it sensible is to eliminate the costly bank run. Therefore neither too
lowk(whichispurelyacostanddoesn’tpreventanybankrun)nortoohigh
19k (which prevent bank runs, but incurs a too high cost of holding capital) is
optimal. Thus from now on we can concentrate on such level of k without
loss of generality.
Now the interesting question is: Can capital requirement improve the
allocation in this economy, in comparison to the laissez-faire outcome we
studied before?
Deﬁnition Deﬁne a representative depositor’s expected return function
without equity requirements as (;), such that
(;) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :







pLR2; if  2 (1;2);
E[RH] + (1   )c; if  2 [2;1]
and her expected return function under equity requirements as e(;), as
well as the set S in which the investor’s payo is improved under equity
requirement, such that
S := fˆ je(ˆ ;)  (ˆ ;)g: 2
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Fig. 5. Expected return with / without equity — Case 1
The blue lines of Figure 5 describe the laissez-faire outcome (;), and
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Fig. 6. Expected return with / without equity — Case 2
1 π  
 
1 
[ ] L E R γ  





1 A π′ =   2 B π′ =   0  










A 2 B π′ =   0   1 π′ 
[ ] L E R γ  
1 π  
 




22 π π′ =   1 
[ ] L ER γ  





A B 0   1 π′ 1 π  
   
Fig. 7. Expected return with / without equity — Case 3
the red line shows the depositors expected return e(;) = d0 + 
2 under
capital requirement, which consists of two terms:
 The deposit payment d0;
 The dividend of equity holdings 
2 , which is only achieved in the good














Denote the intersection of e(;) = d0 + 
2 and E[RL] by A, which is
equal to (see Appendix A.4 for detail)
21A =
2(R1   pLR2)
(1   )R1 + (   pL)R2
;
as well as the intersection of e(;) = d0 + 
2 and E[RH] + (1   )c by B,




(1   )(cR1   pLR1R2) + (   pH)(cR2   R1R2)

2(1   )cR1 + 2(   pH)cR2 +





Now it’s straight forward to compare investor’s payo under equity re-
quirements with the laissez faire free riding equilibrium for some extreme
values:
Lemma 4.1 The depositors’ expected return under equity requirement is lower
than the laissez-faire outcome when  = 0 or  = 1. 2
Proof See Appendix A.3. 2
The intuition of Lemma 4.1 is straight forward: There is no uncertainty
when  = 0 or  = 1, so it’s inferior to hold costly equities as we already
explained before.
Then Proposition 4.2 characterizes the improvement in investor’s payo
achievable by introducing equity requirements.
Proposition 4.2 Given equity requirement k imposed by the regulator,
 When A 2 (0;1], i.e.
 






2E[RL]   E[RH]   d0

(d0   c)  0;
then S = [A;B]  [1;2];
 When A 2 (1;2], i.e.
 






2E[RL]   E[RH]   d0

(d0   c) > 0;
and







22then S = [˜ ;B] in which ˜  2 (1;2] and S
T
[1;2] = [˜ ;2];














then S  [˜ ;B] in which ˜  2 (1;2] and S
T
[1;2] = [˜ ;2]. 2
Proof See Appendix A.4. 2
ThethreepossiblecasesarecharacterisedinFigure5,6and7,respectively.
Numerical examples simulating these cases are presented in the Appendix
B.
Equity requirements give investors a higher payo than the laissez-faire
market outcome whenever their payo with a safe bank holding sucient
equity exceeds the payo of the mixed strategy equilibrium with free riding
banks for all parameter values. This case is captured as case 1, shown in
Figure 5. Since free riding partly destroys the value of deposits held by
prudent banks (forcing them to hold a riskier portfolio), it seems obvious
that imposing equity requirements will always dominate the laissez-faire
outcome with mixed strategies. Unfortunately, this need not be the case. It
is quite likely that equity requirements result in inferior payos for some
rangeofparametervalues(asshownincase2—seeFigure6).Itmighteven
be that imposing equity requirements makes investors worse than laissez-
faire for all parameter values. This is shown in Figure 7, representing case
3.
The intuition behind this at ﬁrst surprising result is that holding equity
can be quite costly; if so, it may be superior to accept the fact that systemic
risk is a price to be paid for higher returns on average.
Themixofexanteliquidityrequirementswithexpostlenderoflastresort
policy is always dominating equity requirements. See Figure 8. The reason
is as following: Consider that the banks are required to hold  = (pH)
when  is high. Then when pH reveals, the investor’s real return is E[RH];
and when pL reveals, the investor’s real return is (pH)R1 + (1   (pH))pLR2.
23Therefore the investor’s overall expected return turns out to be
m = E[RH] + (1   )

(pH)R1 + (1   (pH))pLR2

;
which is linear in , as the green line of Figure 8 shows. Note that when  =
1,m = E[RH] > d0+
2 ;andwhen = 0,m = (pH)R1+(1 (pH))pLR2 = d0.
Therefore, m line is above d0 + 
2 , 8 2 (0;1], i.e. the mix of liquidity
requirements with lender of last resort policy is always dominating equity
requirements when aggregate uncertainty exists.
p







Fig. 8. Expected return with credible liquidity injections (for the case of Figure B.3)
In times of crises, frequently there are calls to go back to narrow banking
in order to avoid the risk of runs. Under narrow banking, institutions with
deposits would be required to hold as assets only the most liquid instru-
ments so as to be always able to meet any deposit withdrawal by selling its
assets. Obviously, narrow banking can be extremely costly. In our model,
banks would be required to hold sucient liquid funds to pay out in all
contingencies:  > (pL). As Figure 9 illustrates, under narrow banking in-
vestor’s payo can be much lower for high  compared to ex ante liquidity
regulation combined with ex post lender of last resort policy. Just as with
24equityrequirements,narrowbanking(imposingtherequirementthatbanks
holdsucientequitysoastobeabletopayoutdemanddepositsinallstates
of the world) can be quite inferior: If the bad state is a rare probability event,
it simply makes no sense to dispense with all the eciency gains out of
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Fig. 9. Expected return with narrow banking compared to ex ante liquidity regula-
tion
5 Conclusion
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks have been modelled as exoge-
nous events. In this paper, we derive the aggregate share of liquid projects
endogenously.Itdependsontheincentivesofﬁnancialintermediariestoin-
vestinrisky,illiquidprojects.Thisendogeneityallowsustocapturethefeed-
back between ﬁnancial market regulation and incentives of private banks,
determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available.
We model (real) illiquidity in the following way: liquid projects are re-
alised early. Illiquid projects promise a higher return, but a stochastic frac-
tion of these type of projects will be realised late. We concentrate on pure
illiquidityrisk:Therewillneverbeinsolvencyunlesstriggeredbyilliquidity
(by a bank run). Financial intermediaries choose the share invested in high
25yielding but less liquid assets. As a consequence of limited liability, banks
are encouraged to free ride on liquidity provision. Relying on sucient
liquidity provided by the market, they are inclined to invest excessively in
illiquid long term projects.
Liquidity provision by central banks can help to prevent bank runs with
inecient early liquidation. In Cao & Illing (2008), we showed that the
anticipation of unconditional liquidity provision results in overinvestment
in risky activities (moral hazard), creating excessive exposure to systemic
risk.
Extending our previous work, this paper analyses the adequate policy
response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk, providing a cost / beneﬁt
analysis of dierent forms of banking regulation to better to understand
what type of intervention is required. We explicitly compare the impact
both of liquidity and equity requirements.
Weshowthatitiscrucialforecientlenderoflastresortpolicytoimpose
ex ante minimum liquidity standards for banks. In addition, we analyse the
impact of equity requirements in the following sense: banks are required
to hold sucient equity so as to pay out ﬁxed claims of depositors in all
contingencies. We prove that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing
minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort
policy. We show that it is even likely to be inferior relative to the outcome
of a mixed strategy equilibrium with free riding banks. For similar reasons,
imposing narrow banking (require banks to hold sucient liquid funds to
pay out in all contingencies) turns out to be strictly inferior relative to the
combination of liquidity requirements with lender of last resort policy.
Bypurpose,ourmodelfocusesonthecaseofpureliquidityrisk.Sincethe
return of all projects is non-stochastic as long as they ﬁnally can be realised,
there is no insolvency unless triggered by illiquidity. Given that insolvency
is not an issue, it may not be surprising that there is no role for equity
requirements. After all, in our set up equity is always costly, since it allows
26bankers to extract rents. We expect that equity requirements can improve
the allocation when we allow solvency to be of concern (by making return
of illiquid projects at period 2 stochastic). We leave it for future research to
analyse that issue.
Following Diamond & Rajan (2006), we model ﬁnancial intermediation
via traditional banks oering fragile deposit contracts. Systemic risk is trig-
gered by bank runs. In modern economies, a signiﬁcant part of interme-
diation is provided by the shadow banking sector. These institutions (like
hedge funds and investment banks) are not ﬁnanced via deposits, but they
arehighlyleveraged.Incentivestodance(tofreerideonliquidityprovision)
seem to be even stronger for the shadow banking industry. So imposing liq-
uidityrequirementsonlyforthebankingsectorwillnotbesucienttocope
with free riding. In future work, we plan to analyse incentives for leveraged
institutions within our framework.
27Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The mixed strategy equilibrium is characterised as Proposition 2 of Cao
& Illing (2008). By chooseing 









































rH as a function of 1
rL as Figure A.1 shows:
The slope
1 pL
1 pH > 1 and intercept  
pH pL
1 pH < 0, and the line goes through
(1;1). But rH = rL = 1 cannot be equilibrium outcome here, because (pL)
is dominant strategy in this case and subject to deviation. So whenever
rH > 1 (suppose 1
rH = A in the graph), there must be rH > rL > 1 (because
1
rH < 1
rL = B < 1).
At pL, given that rL > 1 the prudent bank’s return is equal to ds
0 =
(
s(pL;rL)) < ((pL)), since the latter maximises the bank’s expected re-
turn with r = 1 by Lemma 2 of Cao & Illing (2008). Therefore in the mixed
strategy equilibrium, investors are worse o than if all banks would coor-
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Fig. A.1. Higher interest rates in the mixed strategy equilibrium
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose that a representative bank chooses to be prudent with i = ,
and promises a nominal deposit contract di
0 = 
h
R1 + (1   )R2
i
in order to
maximize its investors return. Then when the bad state with high liquidity
needs is realized, the central bank has to inject enough liquidity into the
market to keep interest rate at r = 1 in order to ensure bank i’s survival.
However, given r = 1, a naughty bank j can always proﬁt from setting
j = 0, promising the nominal return d
j
0 = R2 > di
0 to its investors. Thus,
surely the banks prefer to play naughty.
For those parameter values such that pHR2 +(1 )pLR2 < 1 there exists
no equilibrium with liquidity injection. The reason is the following:
(1) Any symmetric strategic proﬁle cannot be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic proﬁle, i.e.  is so small
that the real return is less than 1, one bank can deviate by setting
29 = 1 and trading with investors;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic proﬁle, i.e.  > 0 for all the
banks, then one bank can deviate by setting  = 0 and getting
higher nominal return than the other banks.
(2) Any asymmetric strategic proﬁle, or proﬁle of mixed strategies, cannot
be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic proﬁle, then the argument
of 1 a) applies here;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic proﬁle, then one bank can
deviate by choosing a pure strategy,  = 0, and get better o —
there is no reason to mix with the other dominated strategies. 2
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1


































































A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Generically, there are three cases concerning the relative positions of
(;) and e(;):
30(1) As Figure 5 shows, the intersection A lies between 0 and 1;
(2) As Figure 6 shows, the intersection A lies between 1 and 2;
(3) As Figure 7 shows, the intersection A lies between 2 and 1.
The intersection A takes the value of , such that













(1   )R1 + (   pL)R2
:
The intersection B takes the value of , such that
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Then the set S can be determined in each case:






















31Since e(;) is strictly increasing in , then
e(;)j=B > e(;)j=A  E[RL]j=1 =
 




which implies S = [A;B]  [1;2];
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which implies S = [˜ ;B] in which ˜  2 (1;2] and S
T
[1;2] = [˜ ;2];


























e(;)jB < e(;)jA  E[RL]j=1 =
 
E[RH] + (1   )c

j=2;




B Results of numerical simulations















Fig. B.1. Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0:3, pL = 0:25,  = 0:6,
R1 = 1:8, R2 = 5:5, c = 0:9











Fig. B.2. Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0:4, pL = 0:3,  = 0:6,
R1 = 2, R2 = 4, c = 0:8
O
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Fig. B.3. Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0:5, pL = 0:25,  = 0:7,
R1 = 1:8, R2 = 2:5, c = 0
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